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Aizenman (1992, 1993) shows that a monetary union with a large number of decision makers, who all
1
have access to the printing of a common currency, suffers from excess public spending and an inflation bias.
The main difference with our analysis is that we assume that the distribution of seigniorage revenues among
policymakers is ex ante fixed.
Commitment may also be partial, in the sense that under normal circumstances the policymaker sticks to
2
its promises, while it deviates only in extreme cases (see Lohmann, 1992). Indeed, in practice it seems almost
impossible to design institutions which rule out the possibility of reneging under extremely adverse
circumstances (see Lohmann, 1995).
1. Introduction
Monetary developments in former Soviet republics and, most notably, the plans for
European monetary unification initially set out in the Delors Report (1989) have brought monetary
unification to the forefront of research agendas. Much of the literature suggests that monetary
unification produces an inflationary bias and excessive public spending (Aizenman, 1992, 1993).
1
The lack of monetary and fiscal discipline in a monetary union provides a case for fiscal
coordination (see, e.g., Levine and Pearlman, 1992, Levine, 1993, Levine and Brociner, 1994, and
Krichel, Levine and Pearlman, 1994). Furthermore, several papers find that the attractiveness of
entering a monetary union or admitting a new participant decreases with the number of participants
(see, e.g., Casella, 1990, Alesina and Grilli, 1993, and Bayoumi, 1994).
This paper provides a case against these findings. We set up a simple model of a monetary
union with identical economies in which, in concluding nominal wage contracts, the private sector
acts as Stackleberg leader versus the policy authorities (Barro and Gordon, 1983a,b). In setting tax
rates, the fiscal authorities are in turn leader vis-à-vis the common central bank (CCB), which is
unable to commit. After the CCB sets the inflation rate, public spending is set so as to balance the
2
government budget. This description of fiscal-monetary interactions seems realistic because tax
rates cannot be adjusted as quickly as monetary policy, so that a particular choice of tax rates
provides the government with a first mover advantage (see also Debelle and Fischer, 1994).
Social welfare losses depend on deviations of inflation, output and public spending from
their target levels. If policymakers share the objectives of society while lump-sum taxes and
commitment are absent, insular policymaking (i.e. policymaking at the national level outside a
monetary union) produces undisciplined policies. In particular, inflation, public spending and taxes
are all excessive from a social perspective. Intuitively, discretionary policy uses unanticipated
inflation, which is self-defeating in equilibrium, as an indirect instrument to alleviate tax
distortions. A monetary union succeeds in alleviating this lack of discipline and the more so the
larger the number of participants becomes. The reason is that a large union containing many non-
cooperating fiscal players strengthens the strategic position of the common central bank, which
favors lower inflation than the fiscal players do because it does not internalize the beneficial impact
of unanticipated inflation in relaxing government budget constraints. The resulting decline in
inflation enhances welfare in modern economies in which small holdings of base money limit the
adverse implications of lower inflation for seigniorage revenues.
The objectives of the fiscal authorities do not necessarily coincide with those of society. In
2For the case of Europe, it is well known that labor is relatively immobile (for example, due to linguistic,
3
cultural, social and institutional barriers).
particular, in contrast to society, fiscal authorities may not care about inflation. In that case, to
offset the opportunistic behavior of the fiscal authorities, society finds it optimal to appoint an
independent central bank that attaches a high priority to price stability. With such an optimally
designed central bank, welfare losses decrease with the size of the union, irrespective of real money
holdings. For a wide set of parameter combinations, numerical results suggest that increasing the
size of an optimally designed union raises welfare also if fiscal authorities attach a positive weight
to price stability.
Fiscal policy coordination produces the same outcomes as national policymaking outside a
monetary union and, hence, eliminates the disciplining and potentially welfare enhancing effects of
monetary unification. This provides a case for applying the subsidiarity principle to fiscal
policymaking within a monetary union.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model.
Section 3 explores the policy and welfare effects of monetary unification. This section investigates
also the effects of fiscal coordination. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The model
The monetary union consists of n participating countries. Whereas the common central
bank (CCB) sets monetary policy for the entire union, fiscal policy is determined at the national
level by the n governments. We follow Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995b) in modeling the n national
economies. For the purposes of this paper, we assume that all economies are identical. Each
economy produces a single perfectly substitutable good. Capital is perfectly mobile across
international borders while barriers to commodity trade are absent. Hence, the inflation rate is
uniform across the union. Labor is immobile internationally.
3
Consider some economy i (i=1,..,n). Following, among others, Alesina and Tabellini (1987),
Debelle (1993), Eijffinger and Schaling (1993), Jensen (1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1995a,b), workers are represented by trade unions whose sole objective is to achieve a target real
wage rate, the logarithm of which we normalize to unity. Therefore, the (log) of the nominal wage
rate is set equal to the (rationally) expected (log) price level, p , where the superscript "e" denotes
e
an expectation. Nominal wage contracts are signed before policy is selected, so that unions act as
Stackelberg leaders vis-a-vis the authorities.
Output of a representative firm in country i amounts to Y = L , where L is labor, and isi i i
0
taxed at a rate J . The firm maximizes profits, PL (1-J )-WL , where P and W are price level andi i i i
0
the wage rate (which is uniform across the entire union because the expected price level inflation is
uniform across the union). Hence, (log) output is given by y = (0/(1-0))(B-B -J +log0), where B isi i
e
3Note that output and employment are one to one related in the model. Hence, instead of output we
4
could have included employment in the objective functions, with the target employment level corresponding
to the output level in absence of any distortions.
the inflation rate. For convenience, we normalize output by subtracting the constant (0/(1-0))log0
from y . Without any consequences for our main results, we set 0=½, so that normalized output, x ,i i
amounts to
x = B-B -J . (2.1)i i
e
In absence of tax distortions, x =0 in equilibrium (where B=B ). We allow also for other, non-tax,i
e
distortions due to, for example, union power in the labor market. The first-best output level, i.e.
output in the absence of any, tax or non-tax, distortion is x. Thus, x>0 measures the non-tax
distortions and can be interpreted as an implicit tax on output. In fact, an output subsidy can offset
the implicit output tax (J =-x), thereby driving up output to the non-distortionary level x.i
Society i's welfare function is different from that of the unions, because it takes account of
the preferences of not only workers but also non-workers. The following loss function defines
society i's preferences over consumer price inflation, output and public spending:
V = ½ [" B + (x -x) + " (g -g) ], " ," >0. (2.2)S,i BS i gS i BS gS
2 2 2
Welfare losses increase in the deviations of inflation, (log) output, and government spending (g isi
government spending as a share of non-distortionary output) from their targets. The target level of
4
inflation is set at zero, which corresponds to price stability, and the target for output amounts to the
non-distortionary level, x. The target for government spending, g, can be interpreted as the optimal
share of non-distortionary output to be spent on public goods if (non-distortionary) lump-sum taxes
are available (Debelle and Fischer, 1994, and Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995a). The parameters "
BS
and " denote the weights of the inflation and government spending objectives, respectively,gS
relative to the weight of the output objective, which is normalized to unity. Only relative weights
matter for the outcomes. The limiting case of " 64 corresponds to an exogenous governmentgS
spending share equal to g.
Country i's government features the following loss function:
V = ½ [" B + (x -x) + " (g -g) ], " $0. (2.3)F,i BF i gS i BF
2 2 2
Hence, we allow the government's inflation weight, " , to differ from the corresponding weight for
BF
society, " . In particular, if " <" , the government is 'opportunistic' in the sense that it puts too
BS BF BS
high a relative weight on output and public spending. The government selects the tax rate and
4The government budget constraint is derived in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995a).
5
Thus, D+B is the nominal interest rate, which compensates for the expected inflation incurred over the
6 e
lifetime of the debt.
Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993) and Jensen (1994), among others, assume that 6=1.
7
However, as will become clear, a non-unitary value of 6 plays an important role in our results.
public spending under the restriction of its budget constraint,
5
g + (1+D+B -B) d = J + 6B + 2 , (2.4)i i i
e
where D is the constant real interest rate and where d$0, 2 and 6$0 (a constant) are, respectively,i
the exogenous stock of single-period non-indexed government debt, lump-sum tax revenue, and
6
real money holdings as a share of output in absence of distortions. All countries share equally in
7
the seigniorage of the CCB. Accordingly, seigniorage revenues accruing to country i are given by
6B.
In equilibrium, expectations are rational and (2.4) can be rewritten as,
K / g + (1+D)d + x - 2 = [J +x] + 6B + [g-g ], (2.4N)i i
where K represents the government financing requirement (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995a). It
amounts to the government spending target g, debt servicing costs, (1+D)d, and a labor subsidy
aimed at offsetting the implicit tax on output, x, net of the maximum available amount of lump-
sum taxes, 2<g+(1+D)d+x, which is equal for all countries. The last right-hand side of (2.4N)
represents the three sources of finance: explicit and implicit tax revenues, J +x, seignioragei
revenues, 6B and the shortfall of government spending from its target, g-g .i
3. Monetary union with fiscal leadership
In setting taxes, the fiscal authorities act as Stackleberg leaders vis-à-vis the common
monetary authority. In practice, fiscal leadership is likely to occur because monetary policy can be
adjusted more quickly as fiscal policy so that a particular choice for taxes provides the fiscal
authorities with a first-mover advantage versus the monetary authority. After the CCB sets inflation,
the fiscal authorities set spending so as to balance the public budget.
An independent common central bank (CCB), which is unable to commit, sets monetary
policy for the entire union. Its preferences are given by,
V = ½ {" B + 3 [(x -x) +" (g -g) ]/n}, " >0. (3.1)CCB BM i=1 i gS i BM
2 n 2 2
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In fact, the CCB's public spending weight is irrelevant for the outcomes.
8
The CCB's public government spending weight coincides with societies' public spending weight,
" . Therefore, if " =" , the objective function of the CCB amounts to an equally weightedgS BM BS
8
average of the individual societies' objective functions. The CCB sets the inflation rate so as to
minimize (3.1) subject to (2.1), i=1,..,n, and taking as given the taxes and public spending selected
by the governments and the expected inflation rate, B . This yields the following reaction functione
of the CCB:
(3.2)
so that MB/MJ =(1/n)(1+" ) and MB/Mg =0. Higher expected inflation or higher taxes and non-taxi BM i
-1
labor market distortions in any of the participating countries induce the monetary authority to raise
inflation in order to protect employment. However, the relative weight the CCB attaches to
employment in country i is only 1/n-th of the weight that a national central bank would attach to
employment if monetary policy would be determined at the national rather than the union level. As
a direct consequence, the boost to inflation as a result of an increase in J is only 1/n-th of thei
corresponding increase under national monetary policymaking. Therefore, the impact on the union-
wide inflation rate of unilateral changes in the tax instrument declines when more countries
participate in the union. Intuitively, in a larger union, the strategic position of an individual
government vis-à-vis the CCB weakens.
Government i minimizes (2.3) over its two instruments J and g subject to (2.1), (2.4) andi i
the CCB's reaction function (3.2), while setting lump-sum taxes at their maximum 2<g+(1+D)d+x.
The resulting equilibrium policy outcomes are (see Appendix A)
(3.3)
where we have suppressed the country index i, because the policy outcomes are uniform across the
entire union and where
(3.4)
Parameter " features in (3.3) because the fiscal authorities' public spending weight equalsgS
societies' public spending weight (see (2.3)). Of course, for n=1, (3.3) coincides with the policy
6This is the equilibrium where all policy variables are selected by a benevolent policymaker, who is able
9
to commit (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995a). It corresponds to the Pareto optimal equilibrium given the
government budget constraint.
This is the equilibrium where both fiscal and monetary policymakers select their policies taking the
10
other's policies as given (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995a). With Nash behavior of both authorities,
monetary unification would not have any impact as the resulting equilibrium in a monetary union would
coincide with that under national monetary policymaking.
outcomes under national monetary policymaking (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995a). Expressions
(3.3) and (3.4) reveal that fiscal leadership produces a "spending distortion". In particular, in the
second best, and also in the Nash equilibrium, (g-g)/(J+x)=" . With fiscal leadership, in9 10 -1 gS
contrast, this ratio representing the tax-spending mix is given by ( /" . Hence, under fiscaln gS
leadership, the trade-off between high levels of public spending and low taxes producing high
output is optimal only if ( equals unity. The smaller this parameter, the higher inflation, taxes, andn
public spending become.
The parameter ( thus plays an major role in our results. In particular, a non-unitary valuen
for this parameter indicates that a conflict between the monetary and fiscal authorities gives rise to
a spending bias. Expression (3.4) reveals the two potential origins of such a conflict. In particular,
the next-to-last term at the right hand side of (3.4), which reduces ( below unity, arises becausen
the CCB fails to internalize the government budget constraint. Accordingly, in contrast to the fiscal
authorities, the CCB does not consider the fiscal benefits of inflation in terms of more seigniorage
and unanticipated inflation in terms of less real debt service. Hence, the fiscal authorities raise taxes
strategically to encourage the CCB to boost inflation in order to gain more seigniorage and reduce
the real value of the non-indexed public debt. In particular, by increasing taxes, they induce the
CCB to raise the inflation rate in order to protect employment. The additional tax revenues due to
the strategic use of the tax instrument produce the spending bias. The fiscal benefits of inflation
vanish if 6+d=0. In that case, the fiscal authorities do not have to raise taxes strategically to induce
the CCB to indirectly internalize the government budget constraint so that the next-to-last term at
the right-hand side of (3.4) thus becomes zero.
The last term on the right hand side of (3.4) originates in a conflict between the fiscal
authorities and the CCB about inflation objectives. If the CCB is more inflation averse than the
fiscal authorities (" >" ), the fiscal authorities raise taxes in order to encourage the CCB to
BM BF
produce more inflation, thereby bringing the equilibrium outcome more in line with the preferences
of the fiscal authorities. This strategic use of the tax instrument produces a spending bias.
Expression (3.4) indicates that the spending bias due to the strategic use of the tax
instrument vanishes in two special cases. First, if the union becomes very large (i.e. n approaches
infinity), the last two terms at the right-hand side of (3.4) approach zero. The reason is that, with a
large number of fiscal players, the impact of unilateral changes in the tax instrument on the
behavior of the CCB becomes negligible. In this case, the price stability weight of the fiscal
authority does not affect the policy outcomes at all. The reason is that the fiscal players perceive
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that they do not have any impact any more on monetary decisions by the CCB. Hence, the CCB
prevails in the conflict between the fiscal and monetary players about the optimal inflation rate.
More generally, the larger the union, the weaker becomes the strategic position of each individual
fiscal player and hence the smaller is the impact of the fiscal price stability weight on the policy
outcomes.
The second case in which the strategic use of the tax instrument vanishes is if, at given " ,
BF
" goes to infinity. With an ultraconservative CCB (i.e. " 64), the fiscal authorities realize that
BM BM
raising the tax rate will not induce the CCB to boost the inflation rate.
Substituting the policy outcomes (3.3) into the social loss function (2.1) and using that with
rational expectations x=-J, we arrive at society i's loss in equilibrium,
(3.5)
Special case: policymakers share the social inflation objectives
We first explore the case in which the preferences of both monetary and fiscal authorities
coincide with societies' preferences (i.e. " =" =" ). In that case, the conflict between the
BF BM BS
monetary and fiscal authorities results in a spending distortion (i.e. ( <1, see (3.4)) as governmentsn
raise taxes strategically in order to induce the CCB to take into account the fiscal benefits of higher
inflation. Moreover, a larger union, by weakening the strategic position of the fiscal players,
reduces this spending bias (i.e. M( /Mn>0, see (3.4)).n
To explore how the size of the union affects welfare in this case, we differentiate the
equilibrium loss V (i.e. (3.5), with " =" ) with respect to n:S,i BM BS
(3.6)
As noted above, M( /Mn>0 as the spending distortion falls with the size of the union. Hence, an
larger union benefits welfare if the term between the first square brackets is negative. The two
terms in the numerator of this term stand for the first-order welfare effects of changes in,
respectively, public spending and inflation. The first term in the numerator is always negative,
indicating that lower public spending (allowing for lower taxes, thereby raising output)
unambiguously raises welfare because this spending is excessively high under fiscal leadership due
M(
n
Mn
'
1%1/"
BM "BM(6%d%1)&"BF
n(1%"
BM)%6%d 2
.
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to the strategic use of the tax instrument. The larger is the magnitude of the spending distortion (as
indicated by the absolute value of ( -1), the larger becomes the first-order welfare gain associatedn
with a lower level of public spending and a higher level of output.
The second term in the numerator represents the welfare impact of the lower inflation rate
that is produced by a larger union. The sign of this effect depends on the size of real money
holdings, as represented by 6. In particular, a lower inflation rate benefits welfare if 6#1.
Intuitively, with relatively small money holdings, the fiscal benefits of inflation in generating
seigniorage revenues are relatively unimportant. Accordingly, inflation is excessively high from a
social point of view because the CCB attempts to use unanticipated inflation as an instrument to
boost output, thereby alleviating distortions in the real economy. With rational expectations, this
attempt is ineffective as the private sector anticipates this incentive of discretionary policy to
employ monetary policy in this way. With excessive inflation in the initial equilibrium, the
reduction in inflation produced by the expansion of the monetary union pushes inflation closer
towards the socially optimal rate (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995a), thereby producing a first-
order gain in welfare.
Policymakers do not share the social inflation objectives
Before investigating how the size of the union impacts policies and welfare at arbitrary
levels of " and " , we need to explore the properties of ( . First, in most cases ( will be lower
BM BF n n
than one, indicating that the fiscal authorities prefer a higher inflation rate than the CCB does so
that they raise taxes strategically to encourage the CCB to boost inflation (in particular ( <1 ifn
" <(6+d+1)" , see (3.4)). However, if the fiscal authorities attach a much higher priority to price
BF BM
stability than the CCB does (i.e. " >(6+d+1)" so that ( >1, see (3.4)), they actually cut taxes
BF BM n
strategically in order to induce the CCB to reduce inflation. In that case, ( is decreasing rathern
than increasing in the size of the union:
(3.7)
Hence, a larger union always moves ( towards unity. Intuitively, in a larger union, governmentsn
find it less attractive to use the tax instrument strategically to affect common monetary policy set
by the CCB. Hence, the trade off between low taxes and high spending moves closer to its social
optimum.
To see how, for arbitrary price stability weights of the CCB and the fiscal authorities, the
size of the union affects welfare, we differentiate V (3.5) with respect to n:S,i
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These weights are found by noting that the second best requires that ( g-g)/(J+x)=" and, hence, that
11 -1
gS
( =1. Combine this with the requirement that the inflation rate be equal to the second best rate. This yieldsn
the optimal CCB inflation weight, " =" /6. Substitute this expression for " into the equation ( =1 to
BM BS BM n
opt
yield the optimal inflation weight of the fiscal authority, " .
BF
opt
(3.8)
The first term in the numerator of the term between the first square brackets at the right-hand side
of (3.8) represents the welfare effects of changes in the trade off between higher public spending
and lower taxes producing higher output. The second term between the first square brackets
indicates how changes in the inflation rate impact welfare. In combination with M( /Mn, the firstn
term always raises welfare as a larger union reduces the strategic use of the tax instrument and thus
reduces the distortion in the level of public spending. The sign of the welfare impact of changes in
inflation as a result of the larger union depends on the specific parameter values. Unless the fiscal
authorities care much more about price stability than the CCB does, a larger union reduces inflation
as the fiscal authorities put less effort into inducing the CCB to raise inflation (i.e. " <(6+d+1)"
BF BM
so that M( /Mn>0). This produces a first-order welfare gain if inflation is too high from a socialn
point of view, indicating that the monetary authorities are not conservative enough (this is the case
if " <" /6, see expression (3.9) below). Accordingly, an increase in the size of the union
BM BS
unambiguously enhances welfare if " <(6+d+1)" <(6+d+1)" /6.
BF BM BS
Optimal institutions in a monetary union
We now turn to the question how policies and welfare are affected by joining a properly
designed monetary union. If society can optimally adjust both fiscal and monetary institutions, the
second-best optimum can be achieved by selecting the following preference weights for price
stability
" = " (6+d+1)/6 and " = " /6. (3.9)
BF BS BM BS
opt opt 11
Accordingly, the fiscal authorities should be made more conservative than both the central bank
and society (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995a). The reason is that the fiscal authorities
internalize the benefits of inflation in relaxing the government budget constraint. Hence, they face
an especially strong incentive to boost inflation.
As long as central bank preferences can be adjusted properly (i.e. " =" ), the
BM BM
opt
adjustment of the fiscal price stability weight " becomes less important if the size of the union
BF
increases. To demonstrate this, we substitute " from (3.9) into (3.5) and note that V equals
BM S,i
opt
(n '
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If " 64, ( 61 and, hence, V 6 ½(1+" ) , which equals the second-best welfare loss if 6=0.
12 -1 -1
BM n S,i gS
the second-best welfare loss if ( =1 (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995a). Furthermore, wen
substitute " into (3.4) to find,
BM
opt
(3.10)
The fiscal authorities' inflation weight affects ( only through the second term in the numerator ofn
(3.10). The relative importance of this term falls with the size of the union, n. The diminishing
importance of optimally adjusting the fiscal price stability weight reflects again the weaker strategic
position of the fiscal players in a larger union. As noted earlier, if n64, the fiscal authorities'
inflation weight becomes completely irrelevant, because they are unable to affect the common
monetary policy. In that case, the second-best is reached by adjusting the CCB's inflation aversion
only (i.e. by setting " =" ). Therefore, in a very large union, fiscal preferences do not have to
BM BM
opt
be adjusted.
In practice, society may not be able to change the preferences of the fiscal authorities.
Hence, the rest of this section explores what happens if society can optimally select only the
preferences of the CCB. A particularly interesting case is when the fiscal authorities do not care
about inflation at all (" =0). For that case, one can show (see Appendix B) that the optimally
BF
designed CCB is more conservative than when also fiscal preferences can be adjusted (i.e.
" >" /6). Intuitively, a relatively conservative CCB is required to offset the pressure exerted by
BM BS
opt
opportunistic fiscal authorities to boost inflation. Moreover, irrespective of real money holdings,
enlarging a monetary union raises welfare as long as the price stability weight of the CCB is set
optimally (see Appendix C).
Another interesting case is when money holdings become negligible (i.e. 6=0). In that case,
making the central bank ultraconservative (i.e. giving it an infinite preference weight for price
stability) is sufficient for attaining the second-best, irrespective of the size of the union. The
12
reason is that the optimal inflation rate is zero because inflation does not provide any social
benefits by generating seigniorage. An ultraconservative CCB not only produces zero inflation but
it also makes the fiscal players realize that the strategic use of taxes is futile, thereby avoiding the
spending distortion.
Finally, we consider the case in which the fiscal authorities share societies' degree of
inflation aversion (" =" ). For this case, we have not been able to establish unambiguous
BF BS
analytical results concerning the welfare effects of an increase in the size of a monetary union with
an optimally designed CCB. Accordingly, we resorted to numerical simulations for a wide variety
11
We used a grid made up of all the possible combinations of the following parameter values: for " , "
13
BS gS
and 6 we used the values 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2 and 10; for d we used 0, 1 and 2; for n we chose 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10.
This yields a total of 1875 parameter combinations.
of parameter combinations. For all of the parameter combinations investigated, we found that the
13
welfare loss was decreasing in n when " was optimally adjusted.
BM
opt
12
Using a different model, Rogoff (1985) shows that monetary policy coordination may be
14
counterproductive, because coordination may worsen the credibility problem of central banks vis-à-vis the
private sector. Thus, Rogoff (1985) provides another example of the general result that coordination among a
subset of players may be counterproductive, because removing one distortion (i.e. the failure to internalize
externalities) may exacerbate another distortion (absence of commitment).
Fiscal coordination can be counterproductive
Fiscal coordination changes the strategic interactions. In the absence of coordination, the
effect of unilateral changes in the tax instrument on the common monetary policy is relatively
small, especially if the monetary union becomes large (see equation (3.1)). This discourages
governments from using the tax instrument strategically vis-a-vis the CCB. With coordination,
however, each fiscal player internalizes the effects of a unilateral tax change on the other fiscal
players. This encourages the fiscal authorities to employ their tax instruments so as to encourage
the CCB to change the inflation rate in the direction preferred by the fiscal players. In this way,
fiscal cooperation strengthens the strategic position of the fiscal authorities.
With fiscal coordination, tax rates and public spending levels are selected by a
supranational authority who minimizes an equally weighted sum of the individual fiscal authorities'
loss functions. Not surprisingly, with symmetric countries, fiscal coordination yields the same
policy outcomes as under national policymaking (Appendix D). Hence, if policymakers share the
social preferences, fiscal coordination weakens discipline as inflation, taxes and public spending all
increase. Therefore, with low money holdings and hence small social benefits from seigniorage,
fiscal coordination harms welfare. As shown above, with completely opportunistic fiscal authorities
(i.e. " =0) and an optimally designed CCB, fiscal coordination is always counterproductive,
BF
irrespective of real money holdings. Moreover, the numerical results discussed earlier suggest that
fiscal coordination unambiguously deteriorates welfare with an optimally designed CCB, also if
fiscal authorities do care about inflation. Hence, if the fiscal players coordinate, an appropriate
adjustment of fiscal preferences for price stability becomes more important in order to prevent
excessive inflation and public spending. However, changing fiscal preferences may be difficult to
implement in practice. Hence, our results strengthen the case for subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking
to reduce spending and inflation biases originating in the inability to commit.
14
4. Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that, under fiscal leadership, monetary unification may
discipline fiscal and monetary policy, thereby reducing inflation, taxes and public spending. In
modern economies with relatively small money holdings, the disciplining effects of monetary union
boost welfare. For such economies, the attractiveness of joining a monetary union increases in its
size. Intuitively, in a union with an increasing number of fiscal players, the strategic position of
each of the fiscal authorities weakens. This reduces inflation and public spending, thereby offsetting
the inflation bias due to the absence of commitment and the spending bias due to the strategic use
13
of the tax instrument. By restoring the strategic position of the fiscal players vis-à-vis the monetary
authorities, fiscal policy coordination destroys the disciplining effect of a union.
When the fiscal authorities do not care about inflation at all, a larger union with an
optimally designed CCB unambiguously raises welfare, irrespective of the size of money holdings.
To counteract the opportunistic fiscal players, the CCB should be made more conservative than in
the absence of fiscal leadership (i.e. in the second best). However, the optimal price stability weight
of the CCB converges to that in the second best (i.e. in the absence of fiscal leadership) if the
union becomes infinitely large. For the case of benevolent fiscal authorities, numerical results
reveal that increasing the size of an optimally designed union raises welfare.
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Appendices
A: Derivation of policy outcomes (3.3).
The reaction function of the CCB (3.2) has already been derived in the main text.
The Lagrangian of the fiscal authority of country i is,
½[" B + (B-B -J - x) + " (g -g) ] + 8[g +(1+D+B -B)d-J -6B-2], (A.1)
BF i gS i i i
2 e 2 2 e
where B is given by the CCB's reaction function (3.2). The first order conditions for taxes and public
spending are,
(A.2)
(A.3)
where MB/MJ is evaluated along the reaction curve of the CCB (3.2). Because the economies are identical, ini
equilibrium fiscal policies are the same for all countries and, hence, in equilibrium, B=(J +x)/" . Substitutei BM
this expression into (A.2), also substitute MB/MJ =(1/n)(1+" ) (from the CCB's reaction function) into (A.2),i BM
-1
impose rational expectations (B =B) on (A.2), multiply both sides by (1+" ) and rearrange, to yield:e
BM
(A.4)
Substitute (A.3) into (A.4) to yield,
(A.5)
Substitute (A.5) and 6B=6(J +x)/" into the government financing requirement (2.4N) and rewrite to yield thei BM
solution for J +x. The solutions for the other policy instruments follow easily.i
B: Proof that if " =0 and 6>0, the optimal CCB is more conservative then " /6.
BF BS
If " =0,
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and, hence,
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Differentiate V with respect to " and rearrange to find that the sign of MV /M" is given by the sign of,S,i BM S,i BM
(B.3)
where
(B.4)
(B.5)
Note, also for later use, that for " close enough to zero, A and B are both negative and, hence MV /M" is
BM S,i BM
negative. Moreover, if 6>0, for " large enough, A and B are both positive and, hence, MV /M" is positive.
BM S,i BM
Hence, if 6>0, there exists a value of " between zero and infinity at which V reaches a global minimum
BM S,i
and at which MV /M" =0. Denote this optimal value for " by " .S,i BM BM BM
opt
Because ( <1, we have that A<0 and B<0 for " #" /6 and, hence, that MV /M" <0 for " #" /6.n BM BS S,i BM BM BS
Hence, there can be no optimum 0<" #" /6.
BM BS
opt
C: Proof that an increase in the size of a union with an optimal CCB raises welfare
if " =0 and the degree of CCB conservatism is optimally adjusted
BF
Note that if, " =0, an increase in n raises ( . Differentiate V with respect to ( which yields,
BF n S,i n
(C.1)
Clearly, for 6=0, MV /M( <0. Remember that for 6>0, there exists a value of " between zero and infinity atS,i n BM
which V reaches a global minimum and at which MV /M" =0. Denote this optimal value of " byS,i S,i BM BM
" (n).
BM
opt
Note that the numerator in the coefficient of K equals B (B.5). If we can show that this numerator is
2
negative, then a marginal increase in n reduces welfare loss, given " =" (n).
BM BM
opt
Because ( <1, MV /M( can only be non-negative if " >" /6( . Therefore, suppose thatn S,i n BM BS n
" (n)>" /6( and that B$0. Again, because ( <1, this implies that A>0 if " =" (n). Combine this
BM BS n n BM BM
opt opt
with (B.2) and (B.3), to imply that MV /M" >0 if " =" (n). This yields a contradiction, so that " (n)S,i BM BM BM BM
opt opt
cannot be an optimum or B cannot be non-negative. Hence, at an optimum " =" (n), MV /M( <0.
BM BM S,i n
opt
The result that a marginal increase in n reduces welfare losses when evaluated at " =" (n) is
BM BM
opt
independent of n. Hence, if we increase the number of participants from m$1 (where m is integer), with
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" =" (m), to m+1, adjusting " to " (m+1), welfare losses will be reduced (because they are reduced
BM BM BM BM
opt opt
for all subsequent marginal increases in n, while adjusting " optimally).
BM
D: Proof that fiscal coordination yields the same outcomes as insular fiscal policymaking.
The Lagrangian of the supranational fiscal policymaker is given by,
½{" B + 3 [(B-B -J - x) + " (g -g) ]/n} + 3 8 [g +(1+D+B -B)d-J -6B-2], (D.1)
BF i=1 i gS i i=1 i i i
2 n e 2 2 n e
where B is given by the CCB's reaction function (3.2). The first-order conditions for taxation and public
spending in country i are,
(D.2)
(D.3)
where MB/MJ =(1/n)(1+" ) . Again, because the economies are identical, in equilibrium fiscal policies are thei BM
-1
same for all countries and, hence, in equilibrium, B=(J +x)/" . Substitute this expression into (D.2), alsoi BM
substitute MB/MJ =(1/n)(1+" ) into (D.2), impose rational expectations (B =B) on (D.2), use that (ini BM
-1 e
equilibrium) J =J , multiply both sides by n(1+" ) and rewrite, to yield:j i BM
(D.4)
Because in equilibrium public spending is the same for all countries, (D.3) implies that the Lagrange
multipliers are the same for all j=1,..,n. Use this and substitute (D.3) into (D.4), to yield,
(D.5)
Combine (D.5) and 6B=(J +x)/" with the government financing requirement (2.4N) to obtain the equilibriumi BM
policies. These coincide with the outcomes in (3.3) for n=1.
